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Social work curriculum on social action-oriented organizing
methods is often devoid of content on the day-to-day role of the
organizer in recruiting diverse participants, facilitating group
decision-making, and planning and implementing campaigns.
Little attention is paid to how tactical decisions are made and
how the ethical implications of these decisions are weighed. In this
study, professional organizers were interviewed about how they
viewed their work, their relationships with their constituents, and
the values and ethical principles used to make tactical decisions.
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Community organizers engaged in social action often
choose from a range of strategies and tactics that can include
consensus-oriented actions to protests and civil disobedience (Staples, 2004). Contest or confrontation tactics are often
used to dramatize issues, attract allies to a cause, and force an
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opponent to negotiate. They can also be used to intimidate
targets and throw the other side off-guard (Homan, 2011). For
example, some organizers believe that the seriousness of the
issue (risk of death or injury to innocent populations) could
require the escalation of confrontation-related tactics such as
the use of civil disobedience (Mondros, 2005). Conway (2003)
defines civil disobedience as “a specific form of extra-parliamentary political action involving the deliberate, principled,
and public breaking of a law that is perceived to be unjust” (p.
508).
In some cases, participants may actually intend to put
themselves at risk of arrest as a means of calling attention to
social problems or political oppression (McAdam & Tarrow,
2000). In addition to arrest, participants in social action campaigns may also risk losing their jobs, harassment, or physical
harm by opponents or the police. Given the possible ramifications associated with using these methods, little discussion
has taken place in the social work literature about the ethical
implications involved in applying these tactics. In addition,
there are few resources available that assist newly employed
organizers or social work students in reconciling differences
between tactical procedures used in social action campaigns,
personal values, and the ethical principles contained in the
National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics
(2008). Curriculum in schools of social work on community
organizing often excludes content on social action in favor of
less controversial approaches that rely on consensus-building
such as community development and social planning (Fisher
& Corciullo, 2011). Consequently, social work students often
have a limited understanding of how tactical decisions are
made in social action campaigns and who makes them (Mott,
2008).
This is especially problematic for social workers employed as community organizers in grass-roots organizations
that engage in social action. Often ethical reference points are
limited to Saul Alinsky’s (1971) ethics of “means and ends”
(Reisch & Lowe, 2000). Alinsky, in his description of how tactical decisions should be made, implied that efforts to put
pressure on opponents are always justified if they are used to
help disadvantaged communities gain power. However, most
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contemporary community organizations influenced by
Alinsky’s approach define appropriate tactics much more narrowly, focusing on legal, nonviolent methods and using civil
disobedience sparingly (Bobo, Kendall, & Max, 2010). Given
that organizing work often involves complex issues and multiple individuals and groups, efforts to resolve ethical dilemmas are often made on a case-by-case or situational basis in
consultation with the organization’s constituents and coalition
partners (Barretti, 2009; Ganz, 2009). However, for an inexperienced organizer, it may be difficult to determine “where to
draw the line” in terms of risky tactics, especially when working
with groups who may have different perspectives about using
methods that may not be either safe or legal (Conway, 2003).
In this paper, the processes through which community
organizers and their constituents make tactical decisions in
grass-roots organizations are explored. Qualitative interviews
were conducted with 13 community organizers. The research
questions focused on how organizers employed in social
action organizations make ethical decisions and what individuals and groups are consulted in the decision-making process.
Participants were also asked to identify situations in which
confrontation-oriented tactics should be used and to describe
the ethical implications of those actions. Staples (2004) defines
social action as “bring[ing] people together to convince, pressure, or coerce external decision-makers to meet collective
goals either to act in a specific manner or to modify or stop
certain activities” (p. 9). Grass-roots organizing originates in
local communities and decisions about organizing campaigns
include “those who are directly impacted by the issues that the
group is fighting to change” (Schutz & Sandy, 2011, p. 27).

The Setting
All of the organizers interviewed were employed in the
San Joaquin Valley in central California at the time of the interviews. This region is primarily rural, but contains a number
of small and mid-size cities. The San Joaquin Valley has historically been an entry point for immigrants and refugees from
Mexico, Central and South America, China, and Southeast
Asia (Kohl-Arenas, Martinez Nateras, & Taylor, 2014). The
primary industry is agriculture, with many large farm
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operations located in surrounding rural areas; the majority of
the population is Latino. However, the political establishment
in the region is politically conservative and primarily White.
The San Joaquin Valley of California is also home to the
United Farm Workers (UFW). Although the UFW successfully
fought for the right of farm laborers to form unions and for
the implementation of state regulations to ensure that workers
have access to good sanitation, clean water, and rest breaks,
there is much work still to be done to ensure that farm workers
and their families obtain economic security (Ganz, 2009). Many
of the Latino farm workers are undocumented, have almost
no legal rights, are at constant risk of exploitation and live in
fear of arrest by local police or immigration officials and deportation to Mexico and Central America (King & Punti, 2012;
“Sober but unlicensed,” 2011). While agriculture creates enormous wealth in this region, the farm labor force is paid subsistence wages. Kohl-Arenas et al. (2014) succinctly describe
historic patterns of discrimination and inequality in the San
Joaquin Valley:
Many immigrants first found their way to the region
with the promise of finding a better life, working on
valley farms and saving enough to support their families
both here and abroad. Yet, since before the California
Gold Rush racist immigration, land ownership and
labor policies and practices prevented immigrants
from owning land, marrying, educating their children,
and participating in political life. (p. 8)
Undocumented immigrants may not legally work unless
they have qualified for the temporary Deferred Action
program implemented by the Obama administration in 2012
(National Immigration Law Center, 2013). While California
has passed legislation that permits undocumented students to
attend college and qualify for financial aid, few of these students actually complete high school and have access only to
marginal, “off-the-book” employment (Gonzalez, 2011). Dropout rates are high for most children of color, with many students attending segregated, underfunded schools that provide
a poor quality of education (Stifter, 2013). Consequently,
unemployment rates are high due in part to the continued
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reliance on agriculture and the failure of local efforts to attract
diverse industries. According to the California Department of
Public Health (2014), the San Joaquin Valley contains census
tracts with high rates of concentrated poverty, neighborhoods
in which over 40% of the residents live below the poverty line.
Poverty rates are highest in communities of color. While most
of these neighborhoods are in rural farming communities in
which most residents are farmworkers, some urban neighborhoods also have high rates of concentrated poverty (Cytron,
2009).
The San Joaquin Valley contains census tracts with high
rates of concentrated poverty, neighborhoods in which over
40% of the residents live below the poverty line (California
Department of Public Health, 2014). People who live in communities in which concentrated poverty is high are likely to
experience numerous harmful effects:
Poor people are more likely to live in dangerous
or under-resourced environments and to work in
hazardous conditions, with greater risk of injury, and
greater exposure to pesticides, lead, and outdoor air
pollution. Low income people are more likely to be
uninsured and to have limited access to quality health
care; are more likely to suffer from chronic diseases like
diabetes and heart disease, acute and chronic stress,
and to die prematurely. (p. 1)
Indeed, Valley residents are assaulted by multiple sources
of pollution in the land, water, and soil. According to recent
data prepared by California’s Office of Environmental Health
Hazard Assessment (2014), about a quarter of the Valley’s
census tracts are among the most polluted and most vulnerable in the state. The San Joaquin Valley air basin competes with
Los Angeles for most polluted in the nation, with its major metropolitan areas regularly ranking in the top 10 most polluted
for particulate matter and ozone (American Lung Association,
2014). The eight-county San Joaquin Valley has some of the
most contaminated aquifers in the nation (Dubrovsky, Kratzer,
Brown, Gronberg, & Burow, 1998). Much of this contamination is from nitrates, which are linked to the agricultural
sector’s heavy use of fertilizers and flood irrigation, with
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confined animal feeding operations also contributing (Moore
et al., 2011). Thus the Valley’s bountiful agricultural production comes laced with rampant concentrated poverty and high
levels of toxic pollution, an everyday reality that organizers
work within whatever the cause.

Methods
Thirteen organizers were interviewed over a six year
period, 2005 – 2011. Although the study was originally conceptualized as using snowball sampling, few organizers referred
to one of the authors as prospective participants agreed to be
interviewed, due to the sensitive nature of the research questions. In the course of the study, the research team was expanded to include two local organizing experts. All three authors
employed their personal networks in order to recruit participants for a purposive sample of urban and rural organizers in
the region under study.
Of the 13 organizers interviewed, eight were Latino, 1 was
African American, and 4 were White. There were 4 females and
9 males. Three of the respondents were Mexican immigrants;
2 of these interviews were conducted in Spanish. One respondent held an MSW degree and all but three of the respondents
had attended or graduated from college. Organizational affiliations ranged from employment in local chapters of national
organizations to positions in very small, local nonprofit community organizations operated by one or two staff members.
Two of the respondents worked on environmental issues, one
was a union organizer, one worked with youth, two worked on
variety of urban issues, and one worked primarily on behalf of
African Americans. One respondent combined organizing on
policing issues with a focus on immigration and three worked
primarily with immigrants. Two of the respondents were
retired from organizing work and spoke retrospectively; one of
these organizers had been employed by organizations focused
on Alinsky-style organizing, while the second had worked for
the UFW during the early part of his career and was later involved in organizing in low-income, urban communities.
The poverty of the residents is directly related to the structure, stability, and financing of local community organizations.
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While some of the organizers for this study have been or were
previously employed by established community organizations, several of the respondents worked for poorly funded
or marginal organizations and often raised their own salaries
or worked second jobs to support their work. These itinerant
organizers worked within their own ethnic communities to
promote social justice and civil liberties.
The qualitative research questions focused on how tactical decisions were made, the people typically included in decision-making, ethical frameworks for making decisions, the
consequences of making a bad decision, whether any tactical
methods could be viewed as unethical, and whether and in
what circumstances civil disobedience should be used as a tactical method.
A process of open-coding was used to organize the interview data into themes (Berg, 2009). In order to increase the
trustworthiness of the data, an audit trail was maintained
(Guba & Lincoln, 2001). Data were analyzed separately by two
of the authors and differences among the two analyses were
reconciled. Interviews were conducted until the data reached
“saturation,” the point at which the information collected
became repetitive and did not result in additional categories
or reinterpretation of the data (Padgett, 2008).

Results
Respondents perceived tactical decision-making to be an
interactive and dynamic process, involving both the organizers and constituency group members likely to be involved in
carrying out the action. However, the respondents had strong
convictions about ethical decision-making and the role of organizing staff in making sure the preferences of constituents
were respected and any risks to participants during organizing
campaigns were kept to a minimum. Six themes were identified in the data: (1) Tactics are situational; (2) Tactical decisions
should be made by constituents; (3) Tactical decisions should
be made by consensus; (4) Morality, faith-based values, and
personal principles are important for the success of the organizing process; (5) Ethical organizing involves minimizing
risks; and (6) Civil disobedience should only be used when no
other options are possible.
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Tactics are Situational
Nearly all of the respondents described tactical decisionmaking as depending on the situation at hand, the context in
which the decision is made, the resources possessed by the organization, and the amount of economic and political power
held by members of the constituency group. Several of the organizers described the process as “strategic,” making sure it
is going to be worth doing and that it “falls in line with the
organization’s mission and vision.” An organizer working on
environmental issues said:
To me, it’s kind of difficult to talk about tactics in a
vacuum apart from broader strategies and the social
situation. You figure out what you need. I’m sure that
other organizers have talked about this. You have
relationships to build with each other. You figure out
what you need and what your goals are and a strategy
to get there, escalating certain pressure tactics to reach
those goals.
One organizer described her approach to developing tactical methods for an organizing campaign in the following way:
As far as the issue goes, I always try to focus on the
need. Another thing is, when I try to choose an issue
to organize, lots of times they are emergent situations,
for example, when I find out that a law is going to be
approved that is going to benefit or cause damage to a
large group of immigrants, that is an issue for me to try
and organize.
Although respondents emphasized that the choice of individual tactics should not be pre-determined by the organizer,
several conceded that the organizing model used by the organization in which they were employed often served as a
framework for making tactical decisions. For example, a union
organizer described his organizing approach:
There is a certain set of standard outreach mobilizing
tactics that we are used to, the places that we organize
and the people that we organize. There is a certain
standard, stock set of tactics that we are going to use
to educate and agitate people… Beyond that I think
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it depends… You have an actual target or opponent
or some sort of outcome that you’re trying to reach, a
point you are trying to make with your action.
Assuring a successful outcome was also a consideration
in the decision-making process. One respondent described his
desired outcome as obtaining something “usually for people
left out of the system or [who] should have got something that
they weren’t getting.” Some of the respondents also spoke
about weighing the costs or consequences of tactical decisions
against the potential benefits of goal achievement. However, a
few organizers felt goal achievement was not the only consideration that determined if the organizing effort were successful; the degree to which members of the constituency group
were affected by their engagement in social change was also
important. For example, one respondent stated that an organizing effort could be considered successful, “If I see that the
people that participated in the organizing drive are much more
empowered. If I see they are asking more questions.”
Tactical Decisions Should be Made by Constituents
Nearly all of the respondents described how tactical decisions were made by focusing on the role of constituents.
Constituents were often described as the primary decisionmakers for most types of decisions. One respondent said organizing decisions were made by “the people who live in the
community. I get feedback from them and basically they’re the
ones who make the decisions.” Some of the respondents described the participation of constituents as essential because
they are the people who carry out the action. Consequently, a
good tactic was viewed as one that constituents were comfortable with or that “fit” with the experiences and values of participants. Tactics that did not meet with the approval of the constituents or were not appropriate to the situation were viewed
as likely to backfire. One respondent described a “bad tactic”
used at a rally that focused on [then] California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s decision to veto legislation allowing
undocumented immigrants to have driver’s licenses:
One thing that we believed to be simple, for example,
to break piñatas that contained the governor’s name,
or to burn or throw away video tapes the governor
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had been in, we believed it was going to be an action
that would be morally accepted by the people. And we
later figured out it was not as so; many mothers and
children were frightened by that. They saw it as being
very violent.
For many of the respondents, the facilitation of inclusive
decision-making processes was viewed as one of the primary
ethical responsibilities of the organizer. For example, one respondent felt it was essential that any campaign be “lead by
the people for other people.” A number of respondents felt
this principle was critical for recruiting and retaining participants because “when you do something that’s staff driven,
the leaders don’t take it and you continue pushing it, it is demoralizing for leaders. You don’t build anything and you lose
people.” A few of the respondents reported that they also consulted mentors or community leaders before making strategic
decisions. One respondent gave a detailed rationale for the inclusion of constituents in decision-making and also described
the role of the organizer in providing background information
about the situation to be addressed:
For example, when we wanted to get the police to
stop calling the border control. We have to change the
policy. Having to get the people to understand how the
system works. Having to get the people to the table to
negotiate with the [police] chief. Having to come up
with language for the policy. Having them understand
the language so that they are able to change the policy.
I would feel like they are the ones I work for. If I don’t
explain to them what’s going on, how it happens, what
is going on, the impact, I’m not doing my job. It’s easier
to do it myself. But I want them to take over if I’m not
around. They will be able to call the chief.
Decisions Should Be Made by Consensus
Most of the respondents described tactical decision-making as taking place in the context of dialogue among the organizer and constituency group members in order to achieve a
consensus. One respondent provided a rationale for making
collective decisions that focused on group maintenance:
“What happens is that in reality, if one sole individual decides
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what to do, then there is no organization.” A youth organizer
provided another rationale for constituent involvement as:
making sure that we’re not putting them in jeopardy
for any decision that is made on a tactic, discussing it
as an organizer and the folks we organize so that we all
have a good understanding and making sure we make
a collective decision.
An organizer for a congregation-based organizing effort
described the process as interactive; the organizer must
balance the views of leaders and constituency group members.
Respondents also indicated the dialogue process helped shape
and refine the decisions made because there was often a diversity of viewpoints that should be considered. An immigration organizer felt that dialogue was essential because “[the]
interchange of points of views, precisely helps to understand
the problem in its totality or at least in its great majority. Why?
Because different points of views can help to discover something that I do not see.” Another organizer stated:
You know sometimes you may start out with an
ideal decision, but once you open it up and have a
conversation and everybody gets to discuss whatever
that had to do with that decision or not even about
the decision, but about the material, the topic, or the
activity or the situation, then at the end of that you
have a more “real” decision to make.
Some of the respondents described how they went about
facilitating consensus-oriented decision-making. A former organizer who had a long career working for a number of social
action organizations said:
We might involve advisors—other people from other
organizations who had had similar experiences in
how things would work, sort of trainers, consultants,
that sort of thing—people from other neighborhoods
or communities who had done that so that they could
say yeah this can work. We could do this. The ultimate
decision was with the people themselves.
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Another respondent described the inclusion of additional
groups in decision-making as a “long process” because “we
dedicated time to inter-ethnic work. Bringing groups of immigrants and nonimmigrants together. We need the support
of non-immigrant groups. Issues of non-immigrants need to
be addressed.”
The Importance of Morality, Faith-based Values, and Personal
Principles in the Organizing Process
When respondents were asked to describe ethical decisionmaking, in addition to the importance of constituent inclusion,
many focused on the role of morality and faith-based values
as well as personal principles. Four of the respondents worked
with faith-based organizations and a fifth routinely worked
with church groups. One of these respondents described how
faith inspired the organization’s choices: “one of our pieces
is going to be Micah which is undoing injustice so … we are
going to be asking officials to work with us, make a more just
society, through scripture that speaks to us.” Another respondent spoke about her parent organization’s religious commitment to pacifism: “In general, people we work with are against
violence. Based on that principle, we don’t want to perpetuate
anything that we’re against.”
Additional values and ethical principles incorporated into
the organizing process included liberty, justice, the NASW
Code of Ethics, and personal commitment to help the poor,
the oppressed, or members of the organizer’s own community.
One respondent, an environmental organizer, talked about the
values that motivated him. “You want the movement to show
an example for the next generation and it’s all about dignity,
it’s all about democracy and all about peace. It’s all about
justice and you want that to be consistent in your actions.” The
one respondent in the study with an MSW degree stressed the
importance of professional values:
I know the Social Work Code of Ethics. The ones
about doing no harm. The ones that are technical like
confidentiality. I try to find ways not to be stymied by
those. Organizing needs to be real open so that there are
no hidden agendas. I try to get approval from them so
that I can use their names. That we are all in agreement.
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For several of the organizers, the negative effects of doing
nothing about social injustices that harmed individuals and
families or proactively “taking the side” of people who were
marginalized were the primary motivators in taking action.
Several of the respondents described their commitment to
helping members of their own ethnic communities improve
their economic status or overcome oppression. One of these
respondents said that as a Chicano, he felt that “the strongest
influence I will have will be with all those youth that I can
relate to the most.”
Commitment to helping marginalized community
members was universal among the respondents, regardless
of ethnic background or length of time working in the San
Joaquin Valley. One respondent, originally from the Midwest,
described himself as utilitarian, believing in the greatest good
for the greatest number. He described his views about the morality of tactical methods used in environmental organizing in
the following way:
We knew the woman with five kids, all of whom had
asthma, and she was having respiratory problems
herself. She didn’t need a study done to tell her to move
…. She didn’t want to be exposed to more trucks. So if
you take all that seriously, the question of what’s right
or wrong; it’s so clearly what’s right. The only thing
that’s wrong is to choose the wrong tactic and mess up
the strategy. I’ve never really thought about morality
in terms of breaking windows or something. Everyone
talks about that. That’s never been an issue for me.
Another respondent also had an “ends justify the means”
approach, describing his ethical framework in terms of tactical
methods that he had used effectively in previous campaigns;
“militant, nonviolence, noncooperation, and disruption gets
results and wins concessions.”
Ethical Organizing Involves Minimizing Risks
The organizers identified a number of unethical tactics
including violence, property destruction, slander, manipulation, degrading opponents, lying, name calling, and the use of
profanity. Nearly all of the respondents talked about methods

86			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

they utilized to minimize or do no harm to participants in organizing efforts. The philosophy of “do no harm” had a dual
focus, ensuring that constituency group members were fully informed about or protected from negative consequences associated with their actions and making sure opponents were
not harmed in the course of the organizing effort, particularly
when pressure tactics were utilized.
The organizers interviewed were especially concerned
about ensuring that constituents were fully informed about
any risks they may face in the organizing effort. Providing this
information to members of the constituency group was viewed
as the responsibility of the organizer; ensuring the safety of
participants was also viewed by respondents as part of the
organizer’s role. For example, one respondent said, “One is a
bad leader, he who by his actions does not measure the consequences that they may have on the people.” Many of the
respondents specifically mentioned potential manipulation
by the organizer as a form of unethical practice, misinforming
or failing to inform participants about both the positive and
negative consequences. Another respondent stated:
It is anti-ethical for example, that you know beforehand
that you are heading a protest and you know that up
ahead there are a group of agitators or police agents
waiting for you with clubs in their hands, ready to
strike and you know that your people are unprotected
[and] you nonetheless still insist on taking them to get
beat.
Several respondents described the potential consequences of using confrontation-related tactics or civil disobedience
as much more severe for low-income people and undocumented immigrants than middle and upper-income activists.
Consequences for undocumented immigrants can include loss
of employment, deportation, and potential harm to family
members. A Latina respondent differentiated between potential consequences for herself and for her constituents:
It doesn’t affect me. It affects others. I have the privilege
of being an American. I own a home. Other people don’t
have those luxuries. The biggest [negative consequence]
is being in jail without an attorney because we didn’t

Tactical Decisions of Community Organizers

87

plan it correctly. Being deported for them. Coming up
with the fines. Missing work. The consequences for
our people are greater than people [middle income
activists] who got arrested for the [protest against a
retail outlet chain that uses sweatshop labor]. Missing
one day of work, when it’s seasonal work.
A youth organizer who is also a person of color described
his concerns when participating in civil disobedience that involved trespassing on private property and “people chaining
themselves to things.” He felt that potential repercussions
would not be the same for all participants:
Especially 'cause a lot of us were like people of color
and stuff like that and low income folks—But there
were some other folks who were White and kind of
affluent and they all were really down for it. But we
were hesitant because of our backgrounds because we
knew if anything was to go down we would probably
be punished more severely than other folks.
Some of the organizers were also concerned about the
well-being of their opponents; the respondents talked about
making sure there were limits in terms of how they challenged
or even spoke to those people who were the targets of social
change efforts. For example, one respondent said:
We had a strong sense that even though we would
personalize issues and even though we would have
enemies [we wouldn’t demean them]. Even though
they would speak in that language, I never liked it. We
always said ‘Today’s opponent is tomorrow’s ally.’ We
never wanted, just pragmatically, we never wanted to
depersonalize a person.
Another respondent stated he felt it was important to
protect “by-standers or otherwise innocent people implicated or involved in the outcome of what you’re doing.” One
respondent whose organization typically used confrontation
tactics to pressure opponents described both ethical and pragmatic considerations given to various tactical options:
Are you in a point in your campaign where you have

88

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

exposed your target and now that you think that you
should start putting their picture up everywhere and
personalizing it or maybe slandering them a little bit
more? Does that seem appropriate or is that going to
backfire on you because a lot of people would be more
defensive of that target? Another thing would be, for
example, if you came up with an idea like “how about
we do a hunger strike or civil disobedience directed at
this target?” It would be unethical to force other people
to do it if they did not believe in it because you are now
asking people to put themselves at risk.
Use Civil Disobedience When No Other Options Are Possible
Respondents described civil disobedience as specific
actions taken to challenge unjust laws. One of the organizers
described it as “intentionally breaking a law for some sort of
broader purpose, concern, [or] broader moral considerations.”
Most organizers interviewed felt civil disobedience was just
one of the tools to be considered in the organizing process.
Several respondents felt that civil disobedience should be used
only “when you’ve exhausted all of your legal remedies and
you’ve built a campaign where you’ve tried every respectable
mechanism to get your point across.” Other respondents believed it was necessary to use civil disobedience in order to
gain leverage on opponents or force the opposition to come
to the bargaining table. For example, one respondent defined
civil disobedience “as breaking an unjust law….but at the same
time accepting the consequences of breaking it, in order to call
attention to that law and its consequences and its injustice and
get it changed.”
The former UFW organizer interviewed gave the following
rationale for using this type of tactical method:
By and large, our society has a lot of laws promulgated
or implemented by those in power. One of the reasons
for that is to keep others from obtaining that kind of
power. The only way you can fight against that is by
some degree of civil disobedience.
An environmental organizer also focused on the role of
civil disobedience in giving a voice to the powerless. He felt
civil disobedience should be used:

Tactical Decisions of Community Organizers

89

When there’s no other way, you know, when you can’t
negotiate because they’re not listening, they are not
letting you in to sit at the table, they’re not taking you
serious[ly] as a stakeholder, then you have to have a
strong action that will gain attention to their unfairness.
Respondents repeatedly emphasized that they would need
buy-in from participants before initiating any action that could
involve arrest or any other type of risk. One respondent described how he would solicit support from members of his organization to take action to address issues related to the use of
excessive force against persons of color by local police:
I would again call people to the table and explain to
them the amount of time, the number of years that we
have been at this. The lives of our children. The integrity
of our community. We [the city] were losing millions of
dollars in excess lawsuits and this and that. The civil
rights violations. The time was now. That I would have
felt [that was] the time [to act]. Even if we had to go to
the International Court to prove our point…. We can’t
keep going like this. Something has to be done. I would
have presented it like that.
Civil disobedience was also described as necessary because
of the resource and power disadvantage often experienced by
many small organizations representing people from low-income backgrounds. Several respondents talked about difficulties associated with obtaining permits or insurance for public
marches or rallies that often involved fees that the organizations struggled to pay. In addition, they felt that public authorities were often uncooperative when they received requests
for permits. This often made civil disobedience necessary.
One respondent described a demonstration planned to protest
the deaths of several farmworkers due to unsafe working
conditions.
We had all of the documents; we tried to submit to
them in order. We had the check they had requested.
We told them, you did not want to let me march, you do
not want to let me practice my right to express myself
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publicly, here are all the documents of all the agencies
that we went to speak to and nobody responded, so
let us march. That is what you wanted to do and we
marched. That is a form of disobeying. Our pain was
greater and our desire to demonstrate, what we felt,
than the fear of being arrested.
The on-going oppression of communities of color was also
referenced by one of the Latino organizers interviewed:
Civil disobedience/direct action may be the tactic to
take and people may feel uneasy about it, but that may
be for fear of pushing the ‘envelope’ or ruffling some
feathers, but I say we need to push that envelope and
ruffle feathers because working ‘within’ the system has
its limitations and just working ‘with’ the people that
are oppressing us just doesn’t make sense.

Conclusions
The organizers interviewed for this study used very clear
ethical principles to guide their work, especially in terms of
their responsibilities toward constituents and how organizing campaigns are planned and carried out. All of the respondents described the ethical dimensions of their actions
as incorporating principles similar to those contained in the
NASW (2008) Code of Ethics: self-determination, respect for
the individuals and community they served, empowerment,
informed consent, and risk minimization. They also described
how they developed organizing campaigns and selected tactical methods in response to situational demands and in consultation with the constituents responsible for carrying them
out. Such consultation promotes innovation, helps constituents develop leadership skills, and builds collective identity
and a sense of personal empowerment among group members
(Ganz, 2009). The group process also builds on the previous
knowledge and experience of constituents and ensures that
constituents are comfortable with the strategies and tactics
chosen for the campaign. In this way, too, all participants are
fully informed about the consequences and potential risks of
social action. For all the organizers interviewed, civil disobedience was to be used when no other options were available or
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when social class, ethnic background and/or the lack of political power narrowed their tactical choices. For financially
strapped organizations, risks to participants were viewed as
necessary in order to challenge authority.
The findings from this study may be somewhat unique
in that the organizers interviewed represented marginalized
groups from one region of the U.S., with a quarter of the respondents running small, resource poor organizations; 9 of
the 13 respondents were persons of color who were organizing in their own communities and identified heavily with the
struggles experienced by their constituents. Although most of
the respondents were college-educated, only one held a social
work degree. However, the diversity of educational backgrounds among the respondents is consistent with research
documenting the education and training of professional organizers. According to Mott (2008), most organizers have limited,
if any, professional training or received their education from
public health, urban planning, or other professional programs.
Recently, Boehm and Cnaan (2012) advocated for the development of an alternative model of community organizing to be
used by social workers that focuses on constituent strengths
and assets. This model is also designed to involve constituents in deliberations concerning strategies and tactics and to
construct organization-specific models of practice. However,
as demonstrated in this research study, such a framework for
practice is often used by grass-roots organizations engaging
in social action and has been described in a number of studies
of organizing practice by non-social workers including Ganz
(2009), Polletta (2002), and Swarts (2008). More importantly,
the principles and practices described by respondents are part
of the “professional culture” associated with organizing work,
disseminated in training institutes and through personal interactions and meetings with others, on the job-learning guided
by supervisors and mentors, or through praxis-based knowledge (Conway, 2004; Freire, 1970).
The findings from this study suggest that social work educators should develop curriculum that is consistent with and
respectful of the day-to-day activities and knowledge held
by both organizers and their constituents, incorporating best
practices used in community organization and disseminated
in training institutes with formal academic knowledge. In
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addition, community practice instructors should not simply
focus on such tasks as research, planning, and evaluation, but
also teach organizing students the relational skills such as assessment, interviewing, motivating people to take action, negotiation, and group work that are needed to recruit constituents and engage in organizing campaigns (ben Asher, 2003).
There are only a handful of recent studies in the social
work literature that involve interviews or surveys with community organizers about what they actually do (Bayne-Smith,
Mizrahi, & Garcia, 2008; Mizrahi, 2006, 2007; Rothman & Zald,
2008). Consequently, more research is needed that documents
the actual practice of community organizing by social work
practitioners as well as organizers without social work backgrounds. Researchers should also pay more attention to how
organizing work is conducted in communities of color and how
tactical options may vary based on the ethnic backgrounds or
social class of participants (Young Laing, 2009).
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